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THE SADDEST SHOW ON EARTH:
THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AS APPLIED TO
CAPTIVE, ENDANGERED MAMMALS IN PEOPLE FOR THE
ETHICAL TREATMENT OF ANIMALS, INC. V.
MIAMI SEAQUARIUM
I. WELCOME TO THE CIRCUS: INTRODUCTION
The Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA) is “the most com-
prehensive legislation for the preservation of endangered species
ever enacted by any nation.”1  The ESA is interpreted broadly as
“provid[ing] a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endan-
gered species . . . depend may be conserved.”2  Under the ESA, it is
unlawful to “take any [endangered] species within the United
States or the territorial sea of the United States.”3  The ESA defines
“take” means to “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect . . . .”4
In People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Sea-
quarium (Miami Seaquarium),5 the Eleventh Circuit answered the
question: what degree of harm or harassment to a captive, endan-
gered animal is actionable under the ESA?6  Disregarding Supreme
Court precedent, the Eleventh Circuit’s per curiam opinion held
that “harm or harassment is only actionable if it poses a threat of
serious harm” (serious threat standard).7  This heightened stan-
dard enabled the court to affirm the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida’s grant of summary judgment to
the Miami Seaquarium (Seaquarium), which kept a highly social
and intelligent marine mammal captive in harmful conditions.8  No
1. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978)(discussing ESA’s
breadth of coverage).
2. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys. for a Great Or., ET AL., 515 U.S.
687, 698 (1995) (quoting Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1531(b)(2018)) (explaining Senate’s intent for “take” to be broadly
interpreted).
3. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2018) (listing
unlawful acts under ESA).
4. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018) (defining
“take” as it pertains to prohibited ESA actions).
5. 879 F.3d 1142 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding captive killer whale neither
harmed nor harassed by conditions of her captivity).
6. Id. at 1146 (addressing question of statutory construction).
7. Id. at 1150 (noting expansive reading of “take” not appropriate). See Sweet
Home, 515 U.S. at 702 (explaining use of noscitur a sociis not appropriate to ascer-
tain meaning of “take”).
8. Id. (affirming lower court ruling).
(303)
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other court considering the meaning of “take” in the ESA has ever
imposed the serious threat standard like the Eleventh Circuit in
Miami Seaquarium.9
This Note discusses the Eleventh Circuit’s holding in Miami
Seaquarium in light of the factual record of the case and other hold-
ings in cases using the same ESA provision.10  This Note argues that
the Eleventh Circuit erred in adding the serious threat standard to
the ESA’s taking provision.11  Further, even if the Eleventh Circuit
did not err by adding the serious threat standard, the harm and
harassment of the animal in question meets the court’s heightened
scrutiny.12
Part II of this Note provides a factual background of Miami
Seaquarium and delineates the parties’ arguments.13  Part III dis-
cusses the ESA’s taking provision, its jurisprudence, and relevant
case law interpreting complementary statutes.14  Parts IV and V re-
spectively outline the reasoning behind the Eleventh Circuit’s per
curiam opinion and discuss why the court erred in its ruling.15  Fi-
nally, Part VI predicts the impact that Miami Seaquarium will have
on the ESA’s jurisprudence in general, as well as its application to
captive animals.16
II. IMMORAL ENTERTAINMENT: FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
Lolita, a Southern Resident killer whale (SRKW), was captured
and separated from her familial pod on August 8, 1970 off the coast
9. See Kuehl v. Sellner, 887 F.3d 845 (8th Cir. 2018) (ruling Iowa zoo harmed
and harassed lemurs without imposing serious threat standard); Graham v. San
Antonio Zoological Soc’y, 261 F.Supp.3d 711 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (holding elephants
were harmed without adding qualifier and while complying with Animal Welfare
Act).
10. See Kuehl, 887 F.3d at 854 (demonstrating other courts have not imposed
heightened standard of harm and harassment).
11. For a discussion of Eleventh Circuit’s legal errors, see infra notes 159-92
and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of Eleventh Circuit’s factual errors, see infra notes 195-
247 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the facts of Lolita’s confinement, see infra notes 17-61
and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of background law relevant to this issue, see infra notes
64-126 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning and its errors, see
infra notes 127-54 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact this case will have on captive sea mammals,
see infra notes 248-72 and accompanying text.
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of Seattle, Washington when she was just three years old.17  Shortly
after her capture, Lolita was sold to Seaquarium in Miami for
$20,000 where she has lived in a small pool ever since.18  She is the
most famous killer whale currently in captivity.19
When Lolita first arrived at Seaquarium, she shared a tank with
Hugo, another SRKW from the same region and potentially a mem-
ber of her familial pod.20  Hugo had a self-destructive habit of
“slamming his head against the sides of the tank and breaking his
rostrum.”21  This self-harming behavior is extraordinarily atypical in
wild killer whales and is likely due to being held in captivity.22  In
1980, after ten years of companionship with Lolita, Hugo rammed
his head against the tank, causing a brain aneurysm that led to his
death.23  Lolita has been without the company of another killer
whale since Hugo died.24
In an attempt to alleviate her loneliness, Seaquarium housed
two Pacific white-sided dolphins (PWSDs) with Lolita.25  The
PWSDs often harass Lolita with inappropriate sexual or violent be-
havior.26  In 2015 alone, the PWSDs “raked her skin over [fifty]
times.”27  Raking is a show of aggression whereby dominant whales
and dolphins scrape the fragile skin of less dominant animals with
17. Lolita’s Capture, ORCA NETWORK, http://www.orcanetwork.org/Main/in-
dex.php?categories_file=Lolitas+Capture (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (detailing
Lolita’s capture from Washington).
18. Christina Colvin, Lolita: Fame and Misfortune, WHALE SANCTUARY PROJECT,
https://whalesanctuaryproject.org/whales/lolita-fame-misfortune/ (last visited
Jan. 21, 2021) (detailing Seaquarium’s acquisition of Lolita).
19. Id. (noting that Lolita is most famous killer whale in captivity).
20. Id. (discussing Lolita’s tank companion, Hugo).
21. Id. (noting Hugo’s violent behavior).  A rostrum is the snout of a whale.
Killer Whale Anatomy, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., https://
oceantoday.noaa.gov/killerwhaleanatomy/ (last visited Oct. 15, 2020) (defining
rostrum).
22. Colvin, supra note 18 (describing Hugo’s tendency to self-harm).  Self-
harm is an example of stereotypic behavior, which is behavior common in captive
animals but not their wild counterparts. Joseph Garner, Stereotypies and Other Abnor-
mal Repetitive Behaviors: Potential Impact on Validity, Reliability, and Replicability of Sci-
entific Outcomes, 46 INST. FOR LAB. ANIMAL RSCH. J. 106, 106 (2005) (defining
stereotypic behavior).  Animals exhibiting stereotypic behavior are often under ex-
treme stress. Id. (explaining why animals behave this way).
23. Colvin, supra note 18 (noting Hugo’s tragic death was akin to suicide).
24. Id. (observing Lolita’s profound loneliness without company of another
whale).
25. Id. (outlining steps taken by Seaquarium to help Lolita following Hugo’s
death).
26. Id. (describing Lolita’s sexual harassment).
27. Id. (explaining extent of PWSDs’ raking).
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their teeth.28  Resultingly, Lolita often has “open, bleeding wounds”
on her body.29  When issues arise between the species, neither the
PWSDs nor Lolita can escape due to the size of the tank.30  Several
experts in the field have stated that different cetacean species being
housed together show elevated levels of aggression.31
Lolita currently measures around twenty-one feet long and
weighs over seven thousand pounds.32  Despite her immense size,
Lolita’s tank “is the size of a hotel swimming pool.”33  Wild killer
whales can swim hundreds of miles per day and dive up to five hun-
dred feet in a single attempt.34  Lolita does not have any compara-
ble opportunity.35  She swims slowly in circles, stuck in the smallest
killer whale tank in the world.36  At its longest dimension, the tank
is “just four times the length of her body.”37  The depth of the tank
ranges from twelve to twenty feet.38  According to Seaquarium’s
own records, the water level is often dropped, and Lolita was once
left with a “maximum depth of only eleven feet.”39  The Sea-
quarium’s conditions stand in stark contrast to the open oceans,
where killer whales can freely swim and dive.40
Because of the cramped conditions, Lolita often exhibits signs
of distress and frustration — commonly recognized as “precursors
28. Heather Rally, Exposed: A Veterinarian Visits SeaWorld, SEAWORLD OF HURT
(Oct. 21, 2014), https://www.seaworldofhurt.com/features/veterinarian-visits-
seaworld/ (defining raking).
29. Colvin, supra note 18 (explaining consequences of PWSDs’ violence to-
wards Lolita).
30. Id. (explaining neither Lolita nor PWSDs can escape each other).
31. See Rally, supra note 27 (describing harmful effects of different species
cohabitating).
32. Her Tank, SAVE LOLITA, https://www.savelolita.org/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2020) (describing Lolita’s current size).
33. Her Story, SAVE LOLITA, https://www.savelolita.org/ (last visited Sept. 7,
2020) (highlighting unsuitable size of Lolita’s tank).
34. Id. (explaining normal behavioral patterns).
35. Id. (noting Lolita cannot swim like wild counterparts).
36. Id. (explaining inability of Lolita’s tank to accommodate killer whale
swimming patterns).  In all practicality, Lolita’s tank is eighty feet wide by thirty-
five-feet long due to the “work island” stuck in the middle of her tank. Her Tank,
supra note 32 (detailing impediments in tank).  This is in violation of federal
guidelines for the size of a killer whale’s tank. Space Requirements, 9 C.F.R.
§ 3.104 (2000) (giving space requirements for housing marine mammals).
37. 12 Things Lolita Would Want Miami Seaquarium Visitors to Know, PETA,
https://www.peta.org/features/lolita-miami-seaquarium-know/ (last visited Oct.
18, 2020) (comparing her tank size to her body size).
38. Id. (detailing depth of her tank).
39. Id. (explaining how her tank is often too shallow).
40. See id. (contrasting wild killer whale behavioral patterns with size of
Lolita’s tank).
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to aggressive behavior.”41  Seaquarium’s behavioral records for
Lolita show many well-known signs of distress: “head-bobbing, a
tense body, an open mouth, slapping with her flukes or pectoral
fins, jaw-popping, wide-open eyes, ignoring signals, unusual vocal-
izations, avoidance, sinking under the surface, and deliberate slow
movements.”42  These behaviors are all signs of “zoochosis,” which
is a form of animal psychosis caused by the stress and abnormality
of confinement.43
In 2017, as category-five Hurricane Irma raged the Miami
coast, Seaquarium officials abandoned Lolita and left her to die in
her tank.44  This abandonment made Lolita vulnerable to any num-
ber of fatal injuries.45  For example, Seaquarium’s stadium could
have collapsed around her, leaving her trapped or crushed beneath
debris.46  The storm could have also “undermined the glass of her
pool, causing it to shatter and injure” Lolita.47  Out of sheer luck,
Lolita managed to survive the ordeal and continues to perform, for
paying audiences, in Miami to this day.48
Like her namesake, Lolita is the subject of depraved attrac-
tion.49  Before the COVID-19 pandemic halted Seaquarium’s opera-
tions, they employed Lolita to perform stunts for park visitors every
41. Id. (noting Lolita’s behavior borders on aggression).
42. 12 Things Lolita Would Want Miami Seaquarium Visitors to Know, supra note
37 (detailing Lolita’s abnormal behavior).
43. Laura Smith, Zoos Drive Animals Crazy, SLATE (June 20, 2014), https://
slate.com/technology/2014/06/animal-madness-zoochosis-stereotypic-behavior-
and-problems-with-zoos.html (defining zoochosis).  Zoochosis is a broad term used
to describe animal behavioral patterns that would never occur in the wild. Id. (de-
tailing symptoms of zoochosis).  Examples of these behaviors include pacing,
trichotillomania, figure-eight swimming, and self-harm. Id. (giving examples of
zoochotic behavior).  These atypical behaviors are coping mechanisms for the un-
stimulating and small environments of captive animals. Id. (stating why animals act
differently in captivity).
44. Colvin, supra note 18 (discussing how Seaquarium abandoned Lolita dur-
ing catastrophe without regard for her safety).
45. Isabella Vi Gomes, Lolita, Miami Seaquarium’s Orca, Left in Tank During
Hurricane Irma, Activists Say, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Sept. 13, 2017), https://
www.miaminewtimes.com/news/orca-lolita-left-outside-during-irma-9665020
(describing Lolita’s peril).  Former SeaWorld trainer Dr. Jeffrey Ventre stated that
she was left vulnerable to missile injury from flying debris, blunt force trauma,
extreme stress, PTSD, and exposure to contaminated floodwater. Id. (noting some
risks Lolita faced).
46. Id. (highlighting worst-case-scenario).
47. Id. (describing another way Lolita may have died).
48. Id. (suggesting Lolita is lucky to be alive).
49. See Vladimir Nabokov, LOLITA 270 (N.Y.: Vintage Int’l, 2d ed. 1997)
(1955) (describing character of Lolita).
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day, twice per day, for fifty years.50  The performance subjected
Lolita to many unnatural behaviors and forced her to act like a cir-
cus animal.51  During shows, trainers stand on her, pose on top of
her, and ride on her back like a horse.52  Despite Lolita’s declining
health and zoochotic behavior, Seaquarium continues to “put on
show after show with its money-making star.”53  For Seaquarium,
the show must always go on, even when Lolita is unable “to keep
her eyes open or had recently undergone invasive procedures.”54
In 2013, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc.
(PETA) commenced the present action seeking forfeiture of Lolita,
so she could spend the rest her days in a seapen.55  PETA claimed
Seaquarium committed an unlawful “take” in violation of the ESA,
because “Lolita [was] suffering ‘harm’ and ‘harassment’. . . from
the conditions under which she is confined.”56  In its complaint,
PETA cited thirteen injuries to Lolita to show Seaquarium harmed
and harassed her:
(1) Physical and psychological injury caused by Lolita’s in-
ability to engage in normal swimming and diving behav-
iors in her tank; (2) Psychological injury attributable to
the absence of a socially compatible companion; (3) Rakes
inflicted when the PWSDs scrape Lolita with their teeth
while swimming past her; (4) Stress caused by the PWSDs’
aggressive behavior; (5) Stress caused by the PSWDs’ inap-
50. Andrew Buncombe, ‘We’re Coming to liberate Her’: The fight to free killer whale
held captive for 50 years, INDEP. (June 22, 2019), https://www.independent.co.uk/
news/world/americas/killer-whale-lolita-captivity-orca-miami-seaquarium-lummi-
nation-a8961486.html (explaining Lolita’s performance schedule).
51. Kim Johnson, The Loneliest Whale Ever, PETA2 (Aug. 8, 2018), https://
www.peta2.com/news/whale-lolita-miami-seaquarium/ (describing Lolita’s
performances).
52. Id. (showing pictures of Seaquarium trainers standing on/riding Lolita).
53. 12 Things Lolita Would Want Miami Seaquarium Visitors to Know, supra note
37 (suggesting Seaquarium cares more about money than Lolita).
54. Id. (explaining Seaquarium forced Lolita to perform even if ill).
55. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium,
189 F.Supp.3d 1327, 1335 (S.D. Fla. 2016) (explaining relief PETA sought).  A
seapen is an oceanic enclosure where whales who have spent extended time in
captivity can be reintroduced to life in the open ocean. See Amorina Kingdon,
Luxury Living for Retired Whales, HAKAI MAG. (Mar. 2, 2017), https://
www.hakaimagazine.com/news/luxury-living-retired-whales/ (describing nature
and purpose of seapens).  While not as ideal as life in the open ocean, seapens are
significantly larger than Lolita’s current housing and would allow her to be in her
native waters. Id. (highlighting that seapen is best of bad situation).  Unfortu-
nately, whales accustomed to captivity cannot suddenly cope with freedom and
may react “the same way as humans getting out of prison after long sentences.” Id.
(explaining why whales cannot be freed to open waters).
56. Id. (detailing specific kind of “take” PETA alleged).
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propriate sexual behavior; (6) “Surfer’s eye,” a condition
caused by exposure to UV radiation for which Lolita re-
quires twice-daily eye drops; (7) Blisters and wrinkles po-
tentially caused by sun exposure; (8) Treatment with
antibiotics, antifungals, pain medication, hormones, and
antacids not used on wild [killer whale]; (9) General un-
healthiness illustrated by: a mild kidney impairment, a
high number of bacteria, past treatment for respiratory in-
fections, and a potential recurring lung condition; (10)
Abnormal behavior like listless floating, lying motionless
near her tank’s inflow valve, pattern swimming, etc.; (11)
Significant wear in six teeth; (12) A tooth that has been
drilled multiple times; and (13) Captivity conditions likely
to reduce Lolita’s lifespan.57
Seaquarium subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judg-
ment, and the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Florida granted the motion on June 1, 2016.58  The court inter-
preted the terms “harm” and “harass” to mean conduct that is
gravely threatening to the life of a protected species.59  The court,
consequently, held that the conditions of Lolita’s confinement did
not rise to the level of gravely threatening her existence.60  PETA
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and alleged that the district court
erred when it imposed the “gravely threatening” standard and when
it ruled — as a matter of law — that Seaquarium’s conduct was not
gravely threatening to Lolita’s safety.61
III. WALKING THE TIGHTROPE: BACKGROUND
This section provides background information on the statues
and case law that protect animals applied in the Eleventh Circuit’s
ruling in Miami Seaquarium, which affirmed the district court’s rul-
ing and held that the serious threat standard controls the ESA’s
taking provision.62  This section also discusses case law regarding
57. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium,
879 F.3d 1142, 1150 n.4 (11th Cir. 2018) (listing injuries to Lolita).
58. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 189 F.Supp.3d at 1355 (ex-
plaining PETA’s chosen remedy was with Congress not courts).
59. Id. at 1346 (explaining harm or harassment of endangered species is ac-
tionable only if conduct is sufficiently threatening).
60. Id. at 1355 (concluding no evidence Lolita’s existence was gravely
threatened).
61. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1146 (noting
PETA’s reasons for appeal).
62. For a discussion of animal protection law, see infra notes 66-114 and ac-
companying text.
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how courts should reconcile the ESA and the Animal Welfare Act
(AWA), which are complementary statutes.63  As a whole, animal
protection law is intended to be broadly construed for its purpose:
conservation.64  While most courts uphold this expectation, the
Eleventh Circuit inexplicably departed from established precedent
in Miami Seaquarium.65
A. Animal Protection Statutes
Animal conservation in the United States began in 1903 when
President Theodore Roosevelt established “the first National Wild-
life Refuge at Pelican Island, Florida” to protect endangered water
birds.66  In 1918, the United States passed its first piece of conserva-
tion legislation: the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.67  This Act formally
implemented an international conservation treaty that the United
States entered into with Canada in 1916.68  The Act prohibited the
“take (including killing, capturing, selling, trading, and transport)
of protected migratory bird species” without governmental
authorization.69
Congress passed the Endangered Species Preservation Act in
1966.70  This first iteration of the ESA provided “a means for listing
native animal species as endangered and giving them limited pro-
tection.”71  The Act also called for “an international meeting to
adopt a convention to conserve endangered species.”72  In 1973,
this provision was actualized when eighty nations met in Washing-
ton, D.C. to sign the Convention on International Trade in Endan-
gered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).73  CITES monitors
63. For a discussion of interpretation of complementary statutes, see infra
notes 115-26 and accompanying text.
64. See Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (describing
breadth of ESA).
65. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1150 (depart-
ing from Supreme Court precedent).
66. A History of the Endangered Species Act: Timeline, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
https://www.fws.gov/endangered/laws-policies/timeline.html (last updated Jan.
30, 2020) (outlining history of conservation in America).
67. Id. (detailing America’s first conservation statute).
68. Migratory Bird Treaty Act, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., https://www.fws.gov/
birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/migratory-bird-treaty-act.php (last
updated Apr. 16, 2020) (stating history of Act).
69. Id. (describing prohibited acts similar to ESA’s).
70. A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.
(Aug. 2011), https://www.fws.gov/endangered/esa-library/pdf/history_ESA.pdf
(detailing passing of first endangered species statute).
71. Id. (explaining first iteration of ESA).
72. Id. (stating Act required international cooperation).
73. Id. (detailing nature of international convention on conservation).
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and restricts “international commerce in plant and animal species
believed to be harmed by trade.”74  Later that same year, Congress
passed the ESA.75
The ESA is a comprehensive piece of legislation enacted to
“provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered
species . . . depend may be conserved [and] to provide a program
for the conservation of such endangered species . . . .”76  Under the
ESA, certain actions taken against endangered or threatened spe-
cies are unlawful.77  Among other prohibited acts, “it is unlawful for
any person . . . to take any [endangered] species within the United
States or the territorial sea of the United States.”78  “Take” is further
defined within the ESA to mean “harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot,
wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect . . . .”79  The National Marine
Fisheries Service (NMFS), tasked with overseeing marine mammals,
defines “take” as “an act which actually kills fish or wildlife.”80
SRKWs, like Lolita, are recognized as an endangered species under
the ESA and, consequently, are afforded statutory protections.81
The AWA provides additional standards to “insure that animals
intended for . . . exhibition purposes . . . are provided humane care
and treatment.”82  The AWA mandates licensing for facilities using
animals for exhibitions and does not grant licenses unless the “ex-
hibitor . . . ha[s] demonstrated that [its] facilities comply with the
[AWA’s] standards.”83  The AWA grants the Secretary of Agriculture
the authority to “promulgate standards to govern the humane han-
dling, care, treatment, and transportation of animals by . . . exhibi-
74. Id. (highlighting purpose of convention).
75. A History of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, supra note 70 (explaining
origin of modern ESA statute).
76. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b)(1988) (reviewing
Congress’s purpose for passing statute).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(b) (1988) (outlining actions that cannot be taken
against endangered species.)
78. Id. (listing prohibited actions under ESA).
79. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (1988) (defining “take” within framework of ESA).
80. Definitions, 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2015) (defining the NMFS interpreta-
tion of prohibited takes).  The definition goes on to say that “such an act may
include significant habitat modification or degradation which actually kills or in-
jures fish or wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns . . . .”
Id. (detailing “take” definition).
81. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife, 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (2020) (listing
SRKWs as endangered species).
82. Animal Welfare Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. § 2131(1) (1976) (stating one of
AWA’s purposes).
83. Animal Welfare Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. § 2133 (2014) (providing overview
of licensing procedures).
9
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tors.”84  For example, an AWA regulation controls the space
requirements for housing marine mammals.85  Under this regula-
tion, a tank housing a killer whale roughly twenty-one feet long re-
quires a minimum horizontal dimension of forty-eight feet and a
minimum depth of twelve feet.86  Both the ESA and the AWA pro-
tect Lolita as a captive SRKW.87
B. Animal Protection Case Law
The Supreme Court of the United States first addressed the
meaning of “harm” within the ESA’s taking provision in Babbitt v.
Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon.88  In Sweet Home,
the foresting industry challenged a new regulation that redefined
the statutory term “harm,” alleging that the Secretary of the Inte-
rior “exceeded his authority under the Act by promulgating that
regulation.”89  The new regulation clarified that harm includes “sig-
nificant habitat modification or degradation . . . [that] actually kills
or injures wildlife.”90  The Supreme Court disagreed with the forest-
ers and held that the regulation was reasonable.91  Crucial to the
Court’s holding was a Senate Report emphasizing that “ ‘[t]ake’ is
defined . . . in the broadest possible manner to include every con-
ceivable way in which a person can ‘take’ . . . any fish or wildlife.”92
Further, the Court held that the appellate court applied nos-
citur a sociis inappropriately to ascertain the meaning of “harm”
within the definition of “take.”93  When using nosictur a sociis, the
term “harm” serves “essentially the same function as other words in
84. Animal Welfare Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. § 2143(a) (1985) (stating purpose
for promulgating standards).
85. 9 C.F.R. § 3.104(b) (2001) (detailing space requirements for marine
mammals).
86. Id. (providing required tank dimensions for housing large marine
mammals).
87. Listing Endangered or Threatened Species: Amendment to the Endan-
gered Species Act Listing of the Southern Resident Killer Whale Distinct Popula-
tion Segment, 80 Fed. Reg. 7,380, 7,388 (Feb. 10, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R
pt. 244) (declaring explicitly that ESA protects Lolita).
88. 515 U.S. 687, 704 (1995) (stating Congress intended “take” to apply
broadly).
89. Id. at 690 (recounting case’s allegations).
90. Id. at 691 (detailing new regulatory language).
91. Id. at 700 (holding Secretary did not exceed statutory authority).
92. Id. at 704 (quoting S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 2995 (1973)) (stating Congress
intended ESA to apply broadly).
93. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 702 (holding lower court applied noscitur a sociis
incorrectly). Noscitur a sociis is a cannon of statutory interpretation that determines
the meaning of a word in a statute based on the words surrounding it. Id. (defining
noscitur a sociis).
10
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the definition [of take], thereby denying it independent mean-
ing.”94  In his dissent, Justice Scalia argued that the use of noscitur a
sociis is appropriate and held that the majority expanded the mean-
ing of “harm” erroneously.95  Justice Scalia reasoned that the word
“take” is defined to cover ten prohibited actions that describe inten-
tional conduct.96  Thus, the dissent held that “harm” should be
read narrowly to cover only intentional acts.97
In Hill v. Coggins,98 zoo visitors brought suit against the zoo’s
owners, alleging that the “[z]oo’s conduct is a form of harass[ment]
of . . . its bears.”99  The Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) defines
“harass” within the taking provision as “an intentional or negligent
act or omission which creates the likelihood of injury to wildlife by
annoying it to such an extent as to significantly disrupt normal be-
havioral patterns.”100  This definition does not include “generally
accepted animal husbandry practices that meet or exceed the mini-
mum standards for facilities and care under the [AWA].”101  With
these definitions in mind, the Fourth Circuit held that to establish
harassment, a plaintiff must prove “(1) that the [z]oo’s animal hus-
bandry practices fall within the [FWS’s] definition of harass, and
(2) that those practices do not fall within the . . . exclusion from
that definition.”102  The Fourth Circuit issued its decision without
adding a qualifier requiring serious or grave harassment.103
In Graham v. San Antonio Zoological Society,104 the United States
District Court for the Western District of Texas denied a motion for
summary judgment on factual grounds on behalf of a zoo housing
94. Id. (explaining why lower court applied noscitur a sociis inappropriatly).  In
this case, applying noscitur a sociis would imply that only acts intending to harm
animals are actionable because the words surrounding the word “harm” seem to
require intent. See id. at 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (applying noscitur a sociis).
95. Id. at 721 (arguing courts should read harm narrowly to cover only acts
intended to harm animals).
96. Id. at 720 (reasoning statutory construction supports narrow reading of
“harm”).
97. Id. (holding only intentional harm is actionable).
98. 867 F.3d 499 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding plaintiffs can prove endangered,
captive animal harassment through AWA animal husbandry violations).
99. Id. at 503 (stating plaintiffs’ allegations).
100. Id. at 509 (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006)) (defining FWS’s interpretation
of “harass”).
101. Id. (emphasis omitted) (explaining exceptions to definition of “harass”).
102. Id. at 510 (recounting plaintiff’s requirements for prevailing on
remand).
103. Hill, 867 F.3d at 511 (holding zoo harassed bears without adding
qualifier).
104. 261 F. Supp. 3d 711, 716-17 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (holding factual issue ex-
ists as to zoo’s elephant treatment).
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an isolated elephant without adequate sun protection.105  In reach-
ing this ruling, the district court stated plainly that it found the
lower court’s reasoning in Miami Seaquarium largely unpersuasive
because the court failed to “cite a source for its ‘gravely threaten-
ing’ standard.”106  The Graham court held that it was unnecessary to
invoke canons of statutory interpretation because the “FWS has
promulgated clear, straightforward definitions of [harm and har-
ass].”107  The FWS’s definitions of harm and harass demonstrate
that “the nature of an act that violates the ESA must be more than
any minor injury or harm in the literal sense . . . though the lan-
guage comes far short of requiring a ‘grave[ ] threat.’”108
Finally, in Kuehl v. Sellner,109 the Eighth Circuit engaged in sig-
nificant factual analysis and held that zoo owners harmed and
harassed lemurs without using the serious threat standard.110  The
lemurs in question were living in isolation despite being “extremely
social” animals, and the court ruled that keeping these animals in
isolation violated the ESA.111  Further, the court held that noncom-
pliance with AWA standards “constitute[d] ‘harassment’ and ‘tak-
ing’ within the meaning of the [ESA].”112  The court found that the
zoo harassed the lemurs by inadequately cleaning and maintaining
the pen per AWA standards, leading to a “buildup of feces” in the
pens.113  The Eighth Circuit ruled the zoo violated the ESA and
ordered the lemurs to be transferred to a different facility, all with-
out adding a heightened standard to the definitions of “harm” and
“harass.”114
105. Id. at 751 (holding whether inadequate sun protection harmed elephant
is an issue of material fact).
106. Id. at 741-42 (stating why district court refused to follow S.D. of Florida’s
approach).
107. Id. at 743 (noting that Miami Seaquarium court erred by applying canons
of statutory interpretation when statute provided clear definitions).
108. Id. (deciding injury must be more than minor but need not reach grave
threat standard).
109. 887 F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding keeping lemurs in filthy, iso-
lated cages constitutes harassment).
110. Id. (concluding zoo’s containment of lemurs violated ESA).
111. Id. at 849 (noting zoo did not tend to lemur’s wellbeing).
112. Id. at 853 (stating other ways court could find harassment occurred).
113. Id. (noting zoo violated 9 C.F.R. § 3.84(a) which requires daily removal
of food waste from enclosures).
114. See Kuehl, 887 F.3d at 854 (declining to apply gravely threatening
standard).
12
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C. Complementary Statutes
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co.,115 the Supreme Court
decided whether the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act
(FDCA) precluded a private party from bringing a Lanham Act
claim to challenge a misleading food label that would normally be
regulated under the FDCA.116  The Lanham Act is a federal trade-
mark statute that authorizes private causes of action for prohibited
activities like unfair competition and false advertising.117  The
FDCA, on the other hand, authorizes the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration (FDA) to oversee and regulate the safety of food, drugs, and
cosmetics.118  POM Wonderful, a pomegranate juice manufacturer,
sued Coca-Cola under the Lanham Act for advertising a pomegran-
ate blueberry juice that contained only 0.3% pomegranate juice
and 0.2% blueberry juice.119
In its defense, Coca-Cola argued that its compliance with the
FDCA, a more specific statute, precluded liability under the Lan-
ham Act, a more general statute.120  The best way to reconcile these
laws, Coca-Cola argued, is to hold that “the more specific provisions
of the FDCA bar certain causes of action authorized . . . by the
Lanham Act.”121  Coca-Cola reasoned that if the FDA did not iden-
tify a problem with their packaging, POM Wonderful could not
bring a private suit under the more general Lanham Act.122
The Court rejected Coca-Cola’s argument and held that
“neither the Lanham Act nor the FDCA, in express terms, forbids
or limits Lanham Act claims.”123  If Congress had intended one stat-
utory scheme to preclude the other, it should have explicitly said
so.124  Importantly, the Court noted that the statutes served differ-
ent functions and provided different remedies.125  Thus, the Su-
115. 573 U.S. 102 (2014) (holding complementary statutes should not be
read as mutually exclusive).
116. Id. at 106 (stating issue Court heard).
117. Nicholas A. Fromherz & Brett W. Sommermeyer, The Endangered Species
Act as Applied to Captive Animals: Sea Shepherd Legal’s Amicus Brief in Peta v. Miami
Seaquarium, 24 ANIMAL L. 277, 284 (2018) (detailing Lanham Act).
118. Laws Enforced by FDA, FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., https://www.fda.gov/reg-
ulatory-information/laws-enforced-fda (last updated Mar. 29, 2018) (describing
FDCA).
119. POM Wonderful LLC, 573 U.S. at 105 (giving facts of case).
120. Id. at 112 (stating Coca-Cola’s defense).
121. Id. (detailing Coca-Cola’s preferred reconciliation).
122. Fromherz ET AL., supra note 117 (explaining Coca-Cola’s argument).
123. POM Wonderful LLC, 573 U.S. at 113 (rejecting Coca-Cola’s
interpretation).
124. Id. (declining to deviate from Congress’s intent).
125. Id. at 115 (noting statutes have different functions).
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preme Court ruled that “when two statutes complement each other,
it would show disregard for the congressional design to hold that
Congress . . . intended one federal statute to preclude the opera-
tion of the other.”126
IV. THE TIGHTROPE COLLAPSES: NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
In a per curiam opinion, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the
Southern District of Florida’s ruling that Lolita was neither harmed
nor harassed within the purview of the ESA.127  To begin its analy-
sis, the court looked to the words of the statute and noted that
neither “harmed” nor “harassed” were defined within the ESA.128
Lacking a statutory definition, the court turned to common usage
and defined the words using a dictionary.129  With the dictionary
definitions in mind, the court concluded there was not a “plain and
unambiguous meaning” of “harm” and “harass.”130
The court then employed noscitur a sociis to determine when an
action harms or harasses an animal in violation of the ESA.131  In
doing so, the court utilized the dissent’s approach in Sweet Home.132
Applying this maxim, the court emphasized that harm and harass-
ment are actionable only if the animal faces a threat of serious
harm.133  The court explained this heightened standard is appro-
priate due to the terms “harm” and “harass” being surrounded by
terms describing conduct that poses a threat of serious harm.134  In
reaching the serious threat standard, the Eleventh Circuit rejected
PETA’s argument that noscitur a sociis was inappropriate given the
126. Id. (ruling Congress intended these statutes to complement — not work
against — one another).
127. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium,
879 F.3d 1142, 1144 (11th Cir. 2018) (affirming lower court grant of summary
judgment).
128. Id. at 1146 (stating starting point of court’s analysis).
129. Id.  (defining harm and harass with dictionary).  Harm means “to cause
hurt or damage to: injure.”  Harass is defined as “to vex, trouble, or annoy continu-
ally or chronically.” Id. (defining terms using dictionary).
130. Id. (explaining why court turns to canons of statutory construction).
131. Id. at 1147 (ascertaining meaning of “take”).
132. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1147 (using
dissent’s reasoning over majority’s). Noscitur a sociis is an interpretive maxim that
counsels “a word is known by the company it keeps.” Id. (defining maxim).
133. Id. (holding harm and harassment must pose grave threat to animal life
before they are actionable).
134. Id. (explaining rationale for heightened standard).  The terms in the
statutory definition are as follows: harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2018) (defining “take” within ESA).
14
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Sweet Home ruling.135  Instead, the court held that the canon does
not “deprive ‘harm’ and ‘harass’ of independent meaning.”136  De-
spite acknowledging the broad purposes of the ESA, the court de-
cided “harm” and “harass” must be read as “referring to conduct
that poses a threat of serious harm.”137
Moreover, the court denied that the broad purposes of the
ESA compelled a finding for PETA.138  When distinguishing the
present case, the court explained that the claim in Sweet Home chal-
lenged a regulation “covering indirect action” within the meaning
of “harm.”139  The Eleventh Circuit noted that if the Sweet Home
Court ruled indirect action is not harm, that ruling would have
“cause[d] the precise harms that Congress enacted the [ESA] to
avoid.”140  Although the court did not explain why, the Eleventh
Circuit reasoned that interpreting “harm” and “harass” to mean any
conduct that falls within the dictionary definitions of these terms
would be “out of step with [the] ESA’s purpose.”141
The court continued by suggesting regulatory interpretations
support its proffered definitions for “harm” and “harass.”142  To
support its contention, the court noted that NMFS defines “harm”
as an act that “actually kills or injures fish or wildlife.”143  Because
“injure” is juxtaposed with “actually kill,” the Eleventh Circuit con-
cluded the NMFS intended its definition to require a serious
threat.144  Noting that the NMFS did not define “harass,” the court
turned to the FWS’s definition.145  The FWS does not, however, reg-
135. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1148 (rejecting
PETA’s argument that noscitur a sociis is inappropriate).
136. Id. (suggesting “harm” reaches injury inflicted by means not listed and
“harass” reaches vexatious conduct not covered by other terms in “take”).
137. Id. (announcing “harm” and “harass” definition).
138. Id. (acknowledging broad purposes but not interpreting “harm” and
“harass” broadly).
139. Id. (attempting to distinguish Sweet Home).
140. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1148-49 (ex-
plaining broad interpretation was necessary in Sweet Home but not in this instance).
141. Id. at 1149 (failing to explain why broad interpretation of “harm” and
“harass” is inconsistent with ESA).
142. Id. (suggesting agency interpretations support their definitions).
143. 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2015) (defining “harm”).  NMFS gives “significant
habitat modification . . . which actually kills or injures [wildlife] by significantly
impairing essential behavioral patterns” as an example. Id.
144. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1149 (explain-
ing how NMFS supports their standard).  The court further reasoned that the use
of the word “significant” supports their serious threat standard. Id. (justifying seri-
ous threat standard).
145. Id. (borrowing another agency’s definition).
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ulate marine mammals.146  The FWS’s definition for “harass” is an
“intentional or negligent act or omission which creates the likeli-
hood of injury to wildlife by annoying it to such an extent as to
significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns.”147  Because the
FWS used the word “significant” to describe the disruption to be-
havioral patterns, the court interpreted FWS’s definition of “harass”
only to cover acts creating a “likelihood of a sufficiently serious
threat.”148
Finally, the court reasoned that the relationship between the
ESA and the AWA supports the proffered definitions of “harm” and
“harass.”149  The AWA’s complex regulatory scheme supports this
decision, as it ensures the humane treatment of captive animals.150
The court explained that PETA’s definitions of “harm” and “harass”
would “sweep so broadly as to deprive AWA compliance of practical
significance.”151  Even if the AWA approved particular captivity
practices, the court worried exhibitors could incur ESA liability if
plaintiffs “fram[ed confinement conditions] as an impermissible
‘take,’ no matter how de minimis the harm it caused.”152  Ultimately,
the Eleventh Circuit held that “ ‘harm’ or ‘harassment’ is actionable
if it poses a threat of serious harm.”153  The court suggested this
definition “provides captive endangered animals with an additional
layer of protection from harmful conditions of captivity without ab-
rogating the [AWA’s] complex regulatory scheme.”154
V. THE KILLER WHALE IN THE ROOM: CRITICAL ANALYSIS
This Section will argue that the Eleventh Circuit’s holding that
Lolita was neither harmed nor harassed within the purview of the
146. Id. (noting FWS regulates terrestrial animals).
147. Definitions, 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2006) (defining “harass”).  Regulation
gives breeding, feeding, and sheltering as examples of behavioral patterns. Id.
(providing examples of behavioral patterns).
148. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1149 (reasoning
de minimis harassment does not significantly disrupt normal behavioral patterns).
149. Id. (giving final reason for its holding).
150. Id. (explaining AWA promulgated regulations governing humane han-
dling, care, treatment, and transportation of marine mammals.)
151. Id. at 1150 (reasoning captivity alone could be continually vexatious if
not for serious harm qualifier).
152. Id. (explaining why AWA preempts ESA liability).  The court suggests
that had the AWA approved of a captive marine mammal’s companions, for exam-
ple, plaintiffs could bring suit alleging the chosen companions constitute “contin-
ual annoyance.” Id. (overlooking Lolita’s housing with incompatible PWSDs).
153. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1150 (stating
final definition).
154. Id. (holding PETA cited no injury to Lolita that satisfies this standard.)
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ESA is erroneous for two primary reasons.155  First, the court erred
in adding the “threat of serious harm” standard to the definitions of
“harm” and “harass” because it contradicts Supreme Court prece-
dent.156  Second, even if the court did not err in imposing the
heightened standard, the conditions of Lolita’s captivity rise to
meet the serious threat standard.157  The court, therefore, erred in
holding that Lolita is neither harmed nor harassed under the
ESA.158
A. Adding the Serious Threat Standard to Harm and Harass
Because relevant precedent and Congressional records indi-
cate how “take” ought to be interpreted under the ESA, the Elev-
enth Circuit erred in applying noscitur a sociis to ascertain the word’s
meaning.159  Further, the court incorrectly held the AWA effectively
precludes the ESA from protecting Lolita.160  Finally, the Eleventh
Circuit erred in not looking to other courts to see how they re-
solved this issue.161  Consequently, the Eleventh Circuit erred in ad-
ding the serious threat standard because there is no legal basis for
the heightened standard.162
Committee reports show Congress’s facial intent behind the
ESA’s “taking” provision.163  The Senate report emphasized that
“take is defined in . . . the broadest possible manner to include every
conceivable way in which a person can take . . . wildlife.”164  Further,
155. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s errors, see infra notes 159-247
and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s legal errors, see infra notes 159-
92 and accompanying text.
157. For a discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s factual errors, see infra notes
195-247 and accompanying text.
158. For a discussion as to why the Eleventh Circuit’s analysis was incorrect,
see infra notes 159-247 and accompanying text.
159. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Comtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S.
687, 702 (1995) (holding noscitur a sociis not appropriate to define prohibited
take).
160. See POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 115 (2014)
(holding complementary statutes do not preclude one another).
161. For a discussion of how other circuits have approached this issue, see
supra notes 98-114 and accompanying text.
162. Sea Shephard Legal, supra note 117 at 292 (noting no legal precedent
for Eleventh Circuit’s ruling).
163. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 (stating Congressional intent behind
“taking”).
164. S. Rep. No. 93-307, at 7 (1973), as reprinted in 1973 U.S.S.C.A.N. 2989,
2996 (highlighting congressional intent for broad reading of ESA).
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the House report said restrictions on takings are defined by “the
broadest possible terms.”165
The Supreme Court has similarly interpreted the ESA as a
broad piece of legislation.166  In the first ESA case ever presented
before it, the Court described the ESA as “the most comprehensive
legislation for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted
by any nation.”167  In Sweet Home, the Supreme Court reiterated the
ESA’s broad purpose and explicitly rejected a narrow reading of
“harm.”168  Instead, the Court favored a broad definition of “harm,”
permitting unintentional conduct to constitute an unlawful tak-
ing.169  The majority strongly disavowed the use of noscitur a sociis
entirely.170  Justice Scalia’s dissent, however, utilized the canon to
argue that “take” can be read narrowly.171
Instead of following precedent that directly addresses the inter-
pretive issue in Miami Seaquarium, the Eleventh Circuit surprisingly
followed the approach in Justice Scalia’s Sweet Home dissent without
providing rationale for departing from the majority’s holding.172
Rather, the court suggested that a broad reading of the terms
“harm” and “harass” would be “out of step with the ESA’s pur-
pose.”173  This statement is the closest the court came to explaining
why it departed from the Sweet Home precedent.174  The court none-
theless failed to address why a broad reading would be out of step
with the ESA’s purpose.175
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that when two statutes
complement each other, one should not be read to preclude the
other.176  Although the Eleventh Circuit did not explicitly state that
the AWA precludes actions under the ESA, it came very close, sug-
165. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 704 (noting House’s interpretation of “taking”).
166. See id. (refusing to interpret “taking” provision narrowly); see also Tenn.
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978) (holding ESA is very comprehensive).
167. Tenn. Valley, 437 U.S. at 180 (describing ESA as comprehensive).
168. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 700 (rejecting narrow reading of “harm”).
169. Id. at 705 (favoring broad interpretation).
170. Id. at 702 (disapproving application of noscitur a sociis).
171. Id. at 721 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (advocating application of noscitur a
sociis).
172. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Sea-
quarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1147 (11th Cir. 2018) (failing to give valid reason for not
following established precedent).
173. Id. at 1149 (giving flimsy rationale for departure from majority’s
approach).
174. See id. (failing to provide additional rationale).
175. See id. (refraining from justifying narrow reading with ESA’s purposes).
176. POM Wonderful  LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 573 U.S. 102, 115 (2014) (hold-
ing complementary statutes do not preclude one another).
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gesting PETA’s definitions of harm and harass would “nullify the
AWA in the context of captive endangered animals.”177  In POM
Wonderful, both the Lanham Act and the FDCA “touch[ed] on food
and beverage labeling,” but because the Acts have different protec-
tions, requirements, and remedies, the Court held the statutes can,
and should, be reconciled.178  The Court asserted that holding oth-
erwise would show “disregard for . . . congressional design.”179
Here, both the AWA and the ESA touch on the conditions of
endangered animal captivity, but have different protections, re-
quirements, and remedies.180  The ESA has a citizen-suit provision
that allows ordinary people to hold organizations accountable for
their mistreatment of an animal.181  Whereas, the AWA does not
have a citizen-suit provision and, instead relies on agencies to en-
force regulations.182  Further, the NMFS decided to specifically list
Lolita as an animal entitled to ESA protections, so precluding the
ESA from operation does not show deference to the NFMS’s deci-
sion.183  Thus, under POM Wonderful, the Eleventh Circuit erred in
interpreting the relationship between the ESA and the AWA while
crafting its definitions of harm and harassment.184
Finally, the Eleventh Circuit is the only court to add the serious
threat standard to the ESA’s taking provision to date.185  In Graham,
the Western District of Texas openly stated that it found the South-
ern District of Florida’s reasoning for granting summary judgment
177. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1150 (sug-
gesting AWA may effectively preclude ESA from operation).
178. POM Wonderful, 573 U.S. at 115 (providing that statutes serve different
functions so they should be reconciled).
179. Id. (explaining why statutes should not preclude one another).
180. For a discussion of the ESA and the AWA, see supra notes 66-187 and
accompanying text.
181. Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2002) (permitting
citizen suits).
182. Animal Welfare Act of 1966, 7 U.S.C. § 2146 (1990) (detailing AWA en-
forcement).  It is also important to note that enforcement of the AWA is woefully
inadequate. USDA Enforcement of Animal Welfare Act Hits a New Low, ASPCA (Aug.
10, 2018), https://www.aspca.org/news/usda-enforcement-animal-welfare-act-hits-
new-low (noting current enforcement scheme leaves much to be desired).
183. Listing Endangered or Threatened Species: Amendment to the Endan-
gered Species Act Listing of the Southern Resident Killer Whale Distinct Popula-
tion Segment, 80 Fed. Reg. at 7,380 (listing Lolita specifically as endangered
species).
184. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Sea-
quarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1150 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding statutes do not permit
PETA’s definitions).
185. For a discussion of other courts’ interpretations of the taking provision
as it relates to endangered animals in captivity, see supra notes 98-114 and accom-
panying text.
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“largely unpersuasive.”186  The Graham court refused to apply the
Southern District of Florida’s novel standard because there was “no
support for this standard in the ESA, the AWA, or the relevant regu-
lations.”187  The Western District of Texas further held that compli-
ance with the AWA is not dispositive of the issue of ESA liability.188
The Fourth Circuit also declined to utilize noscitur a sociis in
deciding Hill.189  Instead of turning to maxims of statutory con-
struction, the Hill court relied on Congress’s broad intent behind
the ESA.190  The Fourth Circuit further criticized the “protection-
narrowing” interpretation of “harass” as a direct conflict with the
ESA’s broad purposes.191  Although the Southern District of Florida
handed down the preliminary Miami Seaquarium decision before
the Fourth Circuit decided Hill, the court refused to engage with a
comparable interpretation of the ESA’s taking provision.192
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision to impose the serious
threat standard was erroneous for three reasons: (1) it disregarded
congressional records showing the ESA is meant to apply broadly,
(2) it failed to consider relevant Supreme Court precedent, and (3)
it overlooked the fact that, in light of the precedent and congres-
sional records, other courts have refused to apply canons of statu-
tory construction to resolve this issue.193  Perhaps concern for
Florida’s tourism industry, or animus toward litigious organizations
like PETA, played some role in the Eleventh Circuit’s departure
from settled principles.194
186. Graham v. San Antonio Zoological Soc’y, 261 F. Supp. 3d 711, 741 (W.D.
Tex. 2017) (remaining unpersuaded by PETA lower court’s holding).
187. Id. at 743 (stating why PETA court erred).  The Western District of Texas
further stated that the PETA court overlooked the clear definitions promulgated
by relevant agencies. Id. (explaining error further).
188. Id. at 745 (finding AWA compliance does not preclude ESA liability).
189. Hill v. Coggins, 867 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2017) (declining to adopt
Southern District of Florida’s approach).
190. Id. at 510 (relying on congressional intent over maxims of statutory
construction).
191. See id. (criticizing lower court for attempting to narrow ESA protections).
192. See generally id. (failing to discuss narrow interpretation).
193. For a discussion of the court’s legal errors, see supra notes 159-192 and
accompanying text.
194. For a valuation of these animals, see infra note 251 and accompanying
text.
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B. Harmful and Harassing Conditions of Lolita’s Confinement
It is well documented in the scientific community that killer
whales are highly intelligent, social creatures.195  In the wild, they
live in “tight-knit family groups that share a sophisticated, unique
culture that is passed down through generations.”196  Different
communities of whales even have different “languages,” and the
calls are so distinct that researchers can identify them by ear
alone.197  When biologist Ken Balcomb played recorded calls of
Lolita’s familial pod, Lolita could recognize and respond to the
calls.198  Killer whales are also apex predators and very active swim-
mers.199  In the wild, killer whales swim hundreds of miles per day
and can dive as deep as five hundred feet in a single dive.200
Lolita’s tank is essentially the size of a hotel swimming pool,
measuring thirty-five feet wide, eighty feet across, and twenty feet
deep.201  Seaquarium’s records indicate that they frequently drop
water levels, sometimes leaving her with only eleven feet to dive.202
When she is not performing, Lolita “floats listlessly” or swims in cir-
cles around the perimeter of her tank.203  These atypical, repetitive
behaviors are signs of zoochosis.204  Zoochosis is a direct result of
195. Facts About Orcas (Killer Whales), WHALE & DOLPHIN CONSERVATION,
https://us.whales.org/whales-dolphins/facts-about-orcas/ (last visited Oct. 2,
2020) (explaining killer whale intelligence and communication).
196. Orca, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC, https://www.nationalgeographic.com/ani-
mals/mammals/o/orca/#close (last visited Sept. 25, 2020) (explaining killer
whale culture).
197. What Are Killer Whales Saying?, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Nov. 3, 2013), https:/
/blog.nationalgeographic.org/2013/11/03/what-are-killer-whales-saying/ (detail-
ing killer whale languages and calls).
198. Colvin, supra note 18 (suggesting Lolita remembers her family).
199. Facts About Orcas (Killer Whales), supra note 195 (noting wild killer whale
behavior).  An apex predator is “at the top of a food chain [and] not preyed upon
by any other animal.” Apex Predator, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/apex%20predator (last visited Dec. 22,
2020) (defining apex predator).  Examples of apex predators include bears,
wolves, sharks, and lions. Stier ET AL., Ecosystem Context and Historical Contingency in
Apex Predator Recoveries, SCI. ADVANCES, May 27, 2016, at 1 (listing examples of other
apex predators).
200. Her Story, supra note 33 (detailing extent of wild killer whale mobility).
201. Id. (highlighting Lolita’s tank is much too small to engage in normal
behavioral patterns).
202. 12 Things Lolita Would Want Miami Seaquarium Visitors to Know, supra note
37 (detailing how tank water levels often drop).
203. Id. (explaining Lolita’s behavioral patterns compared to wild killer
whales).
204. Id. (stating Lolita displays signs of depression).
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the stress and depression captive animals feel as a result of “frustra-
tion of natural behaviour patterns.”205
The definitions of harm and harass proffered by the relevant
agencies and accepted by the Eleventh Circuit show Miami Sea-
quarium has “taken” Lolita in violation of the ESA. 206  Both defini-
tions suggest that an animal is harmed and harassed when its typical
behavioral patterns are significantly interrupted.207  The size of
Lolita’s tank makes it impossible for her to swim like her wild coun-
terparts.208  Using the circumference of her tank, Lolita would need
to swim over 2,400 laps per day to equal the minimum distance
killer whales swim in the wild.209  This calculation assumes the most
generous measurements of Lolita’s tank.210  There is a concrete
work island preventing Lolita from reaching the medical pool at
the back of her tank, so she cannot complete a full lap without im-
pediments.211  Because she can only swim a miniscule fraction of
the distance her wild counterparts swim, her normal behavioral pat-
terns are significantly impaired.212
205. Stereotypic Behaviour in Captive Wild Animals: Zoochosis, BORN FREE, https:/
/www.bornfree.org.uk/zoochosis (last updated 2020) (defining zoochosis).  Exam-
ples of other zoochotic behaviors include rocking, head bobbing, pacing, and self-
mutilation. Id. (giving examples of zoochosis behaviors).
206. See 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (2015) (defining harm); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (defin-
ing harass).
207. See 50 C.F.R. § 222.102 (noting harm includes disrupted behavioral pat-
terns); 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (using impaired behavioral patterns as examples of harm
and harassment).
208. See Her Tank, supra note 32 (detailing dimensions of her tank).
209. See id. (giving tank measurements).  To calculate the circumference of
her tank, the equation is C=2(p)(r). Calculating the Circumference of a Circle, MATH
PLANET, https://www.mathplanet.com/education/pre-algebra/more-about-equa-
tion-and-inequalities/calculating-the-circumference-of-a-circle (last visited Oct. 10,
2020) (giving calculation to find circumference).  Here, r is thirty-five feet, so the
circumference is about 219 feet. See Her Tank, supra note 32 (giving radius of tank).
One-mile equals 5,280 feet. How Many Feet are in a Mile, RAPID TABLES, https://
www.rapidtables.com/convert/length/how-many-feet-in-mile.html (last visited
Oct. 12, 2020) (giving how many feet per mile).  The number of feet per mile
divided by the circumference of the tank shows Lolita must swim twenty-four laps
to reach one mile. Scientific Calculator, DESMOS, https://www.desmos.com/scien-
tific (last visited Oct. 12, 2020) (calculating number of laps to equal one mile).  If
killer whales swim 100 miles per day at minimum, Lolita would need to swim over
2,400 laps to hit 100 miles. See id. (multiplying number of laps to equal one mile by
100 to ascertain how many laps are needed to swim 100 miles).
210. See Her Tank, supra note 32 (highlighting inadequate size by even most
generous measurements).
211. Id. (noting large obstruction in her tank).
212. Natasha Daly, Orcas Don’t do Well in Captivity. Here’s Why., NAT’L. GEO-
GRAPHIC (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/animals/2019/
03/orcas-captivity-welfare/ (noting killer whales’ genetic disposition to migrate
oceans).
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Further, conditions of her captivity violate numerous AWA reg-
ulations.213  As the Fourth Circuit held in Hill, violations of the
AWA’s animal husbandry provisions is direct evidence of harm and
harassment under the ESA.214  If a “take” has occurred, the court
may force the captor to forfeit the captive animals, which will then
be rehomed.215  Here, the Eleventh Circuit should have followed
the Hill court’s reasoning and rehomed Lolita to a seaside pen be-
cause Seaquarium’s treatment of her violated the AWA’s marine
mammal exhibition regulations for several reasons.216
First, the AWA requires aquariums to surround marine mam-
mal tanks with six-foot high fences that “keep unauthorized persons
[and objects] out.”217  Lolita’s tank is surrounded by a glass parti-
tion low enough for visitors to rest their elbows.218  If park guests
are easily able to reach over the partition surrounding Lolita’s tank,
it cannot offer her adequate protection from the public.219  Thus,
the physical barrier between Lolita and the viewing public violates
AWA regulations.220
Second, AWA regulations require a shelter to protect marine
mammals from direct sunlight because UV rays are harmful to their
eyes and delicate skin.221  Lolita does not have any shelter offering
her shade, leaving her constantly exposed to the blistering Florida
sun.222  This exposure regularly results in sunburned, causing her
213. For a discussion of relevant AWA regulations and the factual circum-
stances of Lolita’s confinement, see infra notes 214-44 and accompanying text.
214. Hill v. Coggins, 867 F.3d 499, 510 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding noncompli-
ance with AWA regulations is direct evidence of ESA “taking”).
215. Kuehl v. Sellner, 887 F.3d 845, 856 (8th Cir. 2018) (ordering harmed
lemurs be transferred to better facility).
216. See Hill, 867 F.3d at 511 (holding AWA noncompliance can establish ESA
“taking”).
217. Facilities, Outdoor, 9 C.F.R. § 3.103(3)(c) (2000) (requiring perimeter
fence of at least six feet to protect Lolita).
218. How to Fight for Lolita’s Retirement, ORCA NETWORK, http://www.orcanet
work.org/Main/index.php?categories_file=APHIS+Letters (last visited Oct. 6,
2020) (providing dimensions of perimeter fence).
219. See 9 C.F.R. § 3.103(3)(c) (2000) (noting perimeter fence’s purpose of
protecting marine mammals).
220. Compare id. (requiring six-foot barrier), with Lolita the Orca; Facts, Legal
Issues, and How to Get Her Home, THE ORCA PROJECT (Sept. 1, 2010), https://theor-
caproject.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/msq2-perimeter-fence.jpg?w=300&h=225
&zoom=2 (showing picture of park guests resting elbows on Lolita’s tank).
221. 9 C.F.R. § 3.103(b) (requiring protection of marine mammals from sun’s
rays).
222. Lolita: August 2020 Marked 50 Years of Captivity for Another Tortured Orca,
SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF ANIMALS CAN. (Aug. 8, 2020), http://www.spacanada.org/
2020/08/11/lolita-august-2020-marked-50-years-of-captivity-for-another-tortured-
orca/ (noting Lolita’s sunburns).
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skin to blister and wrinkle.223  In an attempt to conceal her injuries
from the public, Seaquarium employees paint her with black zinc
oxide before performances.224  Additionally, Seaquarium’s records
show Lolita has a condition caused by direct sunlight known as
“surfer’s eye.”225  In the wild, Lolita could dive deep beneath the
surface of the ocean to protect her eyes from the sun’s rays, but this
is not an option in captivity.226  Thus, Seaquarium has not done
enough to protect Lolita from the scorching sun under AWA
regulations.227
Moreover, marine mammals must be “housed in their primary
enclosure with at least one compatible animal.”228  At Seaquarium,
Lolita is housed with PWSDs that regularly rake her with their
teeth, leaving her with open wounds that require antibiotics.229  On
at least one occasion, a PWSD “engaged in sexual behavior with
Lolita” as a display of dominance.230  Marine scientist Ingrid Visser
described this behavior as “completely inappropriate.”231  Because
the PWSDs regularly display physical and sexual aggression toward
Lolita, they are an incompatible species that should not be housed
with her under AWA regulations.232
223. 12 Things Lolita Would Want Miami Seaquarium Visitors to Know, supra note
37 (acknowledging Lolita’s tendency to burn).
224. Lolita: August 2020 Marked 50 Years of Captivity for Another Tortured Orca,
supra note 222 (observing Seaquarium’s policy of hiding Lolita’s injuries). Zinc
oxide works like a sunscreen to protect the fragile skin of marine mammals. Ashley
Magovern, MD, Everything You Want to Know About Zinc Oxide, PROJECT SUNSCREEN,
projectsunscreen.com/blogs/ingredients/everything-you-want-to-know-about-zinc-
oxide (last visited Dec. 20, 2020) (detailing benefits of zinc oxide). It is, however,
normally a pearly white substance, so Seaquarium’s black zinc oxide serves the
additional purpose of concealing injuries. See id. (describing how zinc oxide leaves
white hue on dark skin).
225. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Seaquarium,
879 F.3d 1142, 1150 n. 4 (11th Cir. 2018) (stating Lolita has surfer’s eye).  Surfer’s
eye is a condition caused by UV rays that causes a growth on the white portion of
the eye and can infect the cornea. Amy Hellem, Pterygium: What is “Surfer’s Eye”?,
ALL ABOUT VISION, https://www.allaboutvision.com/conditions/pterygium.htm
(last updated Aug. 2017) (defining surfer’s eye).
226. 12 Things Lolita Would Want Miami Seaquarium Visitors to Know, supra note
37 (noting twenty feet is not deep enough to escape UV rays).
227. Id. (acknowledging Lolita is not adequately protected).
228. Separation, 9 C.F.R. § 3.109 (2000) (requiring marine mammals be
housed with compatible species).
229. Colvin, supra note 18 (outlining PWSDs’ violence towards Lolita).
230. See Hal Bernton, Documents Show Unsettling Look at Orca Lolita’s Life in
Seaquarium, THE SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/envi-
ronment/orca-unsealed/ (last updated Aug. 24, 2016) (describing PWSDs’ sexual
aggression).
231. Id. (noting expert opinion).
232. Id. (observing hostile animal relationships).
24
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 32, Iss. 2 [2021], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol32/iss2/7
THE SADDEST SHOW ON EARTH 327
Finally, AWA regulations mandate a contingency plan for the
evacuation of animals in the event of a disaster.233  Seaquarium did
not have any evacuation plans in place for its animals when Hurri-
cane Irma struck South Florida in 2017 and displaced 5.6 million
people.234  Instead, Seaquarium abandoned Lolita to ride out the
storm alone with no procedures in place, or staff on site, to protect
her.235  Foresaken, Lolita could have been killed in a number of
ways.236  She could have (1) gotten electrocuted from her tank
short-circuiting, (2) drowned from debris blocking the surface of
her tank, or (3) been impaled by collapsing elements of the Sea-
quarium stadium.237  Gambling with the life of a beautiful, intelli-
gent, and endangered animal is not only immoral, but it is also a
direct violation of the ESA.238
Cumulatively, these violations of AWA regulations amount to
an impermissible “take” under the ESA, even with the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s serious threat standard.239  Abandoning a helpless Lolita dur-
ing a Category Five hurricane seriously threatened her continued
existence.240  Forcing Lolita into a tank so small — she would need
to swim 2,400 laps a day to reach the minimum distance killer
whales swim in the wild — harasses her beyond the Eleventh Cir-
cuit’s serious threat standard because captivity produces behavioral
pattern changes that result in self-harm.241  On March 4, 1980, after
twelve years of “repeated brutal, self-inflicted damage to his head,”
Lolita’s only killer whale companion, Hugo, intentionally rammed
his head against the side of his tank.242  Hugo immediately suffered
233. 9 C.F.R. 3.101(4)(b) (2000) (requiring facilities housing marine mam-
mals have evacuation contingency plans).
234. See Michael Sainato & Chelsea Skojec, Miami Seaquarium Leaves Marine
Animals in Place During Hurricane Irma, OBSERVER (Sept. 11, 2017), https://ob-
server.com/2017/09/miami-seaquarium-abandons-marine-animals-before-hurri-
cane-irma/ (reporting Seaquarium’s lack of contingency plans).
235. Id. (explaining how Seaquarium abandoned Lolita).  “In contrast, dol-
phins at an aquarium in Cuba were airlifted to safety . . . before [Hurrican Irma]
made landfall.” Id. (observing how other aquariums handled storm).
236. Id. (noting Lolita’s grave danger).
237. Id. (detailing ways Lolita may have perished).
238. See Hill v. Coggins, 867 F.3d 499, 511 (4th Cir. 2017) (holding AWA viola-
tions may establish ESA violation).
239. For a discussion of Seaquarium’s numerous AWA violations, see supra
notes 214-38 and accompanying text.
240. See Sainato & Skojec, supra note 234 (suggesting Seaquarium was lucky
Lolita survived).
241. See Cara Sands, One Dolphin’s Story — Hugo, DOLPHIN PROJECT, https://
www.dolphinproject.com/blog/one-dolphins-story-hugo/ (last visited Oct. 10,
2020) (telling story of Lolita’s former tank companion, Hugo).
242. Id. (detailing Hugo’s self-caused injury).
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a brain aneurysm and died as a direct result of his inability to adjust
to life in captivity.243  Due to the current conditions of her captivity,
Lolita may suffer the same fate.244
Seaquarium’s behavior toward Lolita and its other animals
shows a total disregard for the animals’ safety and wellbeing.245
The conditions of Lolita’s captivity rise to meet the serious threat
standard due to the size of her tank, the numerous AWA violations,
and the total lack of remorse shown when comparable actions
caused the death of another killer whale.246  Thus, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit erred in dismissing these factual allegations against Sea-
quarium and relegating all factual inquiry to one footnote in its
opinion.247
VI. THE SHOW MUST GO ON: IMPACT OF THE MIAMI SEAQUARIUM
DECISION
The Eleventh Circuit’s ruling in Miami Seaquarium drastically
limits the public’s ability to hold organizations accountable for the
abuse they inflict on captive animals.248  Though the court meant to
exclude only de minimis harm and harassment from being actiona-
ble, the harm and harassment to Lolita rises far beyond that stan-
dard.249  If this court believes the harm to Lolita is de minimis, it is
hard to imagine a circumstance in which harm could ever rise
above that standard.250
Moreover, the exhibition of whales and dolphins is a booming
industry; in 2004, a single dolphin could bring in one million dol-
243. Id. (noting Hugo could not transition to captivity).
244. Id. (describing Hugo’s short, painful life).  Hugo’s body was quietly
dumped into the Miami Dade landfill after his death. Id. (describing disposal of
Hugo’s remains).
245. For a discussion of Seaquarium’s many failures, see supra notes 17-61 and
accompanying text.
246. See Sands, supra note 241 (discussing Seaquarium’s failure to care for
their animals).
247. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Sea-
quarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1145 n.4 (11th Cir. 2018) (listing PETA’s cited injuries to
Lolita).
248. See id. (holding harm must rise above de minimis to be actionable).
249. For a discussion of the serious harm Lolita faces, see supra notes 17-61
and accompanying text. De minimis means “a thing so insignificant that a court
may overlook it in deciding an issue or case.” De Minimis Definition, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw (defining de minimis).
250. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1145 n.4
(challenging implication thirteen injuries not enough to establish more than de
minimis harm).
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lars a year.251  Killer whales are worth incredible amounts of money
to exhibitors even in death, “bringing their owners million-dollar
life insurance payouts.”252  With the new serious threat standard,
many exhibitors could be tempted to cut corners to escape liability
easily while still collecting life insurance payouts, should an animal
death occur.253
Further, this decision could lead to continued violence be-
tween captive killer whales and their human trainers.254  Wild killer
whales have never killed a human being, and there is only one con-
firmed case of an attack on a human in the wild.255  Captive killer
whales, on the other hand, have attacked at least 153 people.256
Lolita herself attacked three people between 1970 and 2012.257
Moreover, captive killer whales have killed four people, including a
senior SeaWorld Trainer known for her adherence to safety rules,
Dawn Brancheau.258  Ms. Brancheau was killed when a captive
whale named Tilikum grabbed her by the ponytail and pulled her
into his tank.259  According to the medical examiner, Ms.
Brancheau died due to multiple traumatic injuries and drown-
ing.260  In 2016, six years after Ms. Brancheau’s death, SeaWorld
251. Sally Kestin, Captive Mammals Can Net Big Profits for Exhibitors, S. FLA. SUN
SENTINEL (Dec. 14, 2004), https://www.sun-sentinel.com/sfl-dolphins-moneydec31
-story.html (detailing profits of marine mammal exhibitors).
252. Id. (highlighting how much exhibitor can profit from dead killer
whales).
253. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc., 879 F.3d at 1150 (noting
increased difficulty in proving exhibitors’ liability).
254. Aggressive Incidents Between Humans and Killer Whales in Captivity, INHER-
ENTLY WILD, https://inherentlywild.co.uk/aggressive-incidents/ (last updated
Sept. 2015) (listing all incidents between people and captive killer whales between
1967 and 2015).
255. Killer Whale Attacks, WHALE FACTS, https://www.whalefacts.org/killer-
whale-attacks/ (last visited Oct. 10, 2020) (detailing how infrequently wild killer
whales attack people).
256. Aggressive Incidents Between Humans and Killer Whales, supra note 254 (list-
ing all 153 through September 2015).  It is highly likely that there are more inci-
dents than recorded, as the chart stops in September 2015. Id. (noting lack of data
after September 2015).
257. Id. (highlighting Lolita’s attacks).
258. Elizabeth Batt, Seven Years On: Revisiting the Death of Dawn Brancheau,
DOLPHIN PROJECT (Feb. 2017), https://www.dolphinproject.com/blog/five-years-
on-revisiting-the-death-of-dawn-brancheau/ (explaining Ms. Brancheau’s death).
259. Workers Tell of Desperate Attempt to Save Trainer Attacked by Killer Whale,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2010), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/mar/02/
trainer-killer-whale-seaworld (detailing the attack).
260. Id. (giving official cause of death).
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stated that it would stop displaying and breeding captive killer
whales.261
Seaquarium has not stated similar intentions and will continue
to display Lolita unless ordered to stop.262  In fact, during a multi-
million dollar renovation in 2018, Seaquarium modernized their
entrance, expanded giftshops, and added a brand new exhibit.263
This renovation, however, did not expand the size or depth of
Lolita’s tank.264  The only addition to her tank was a jumbotron to
help the audience see her.265  Despite the massive controversy sur-
rounding killer whale captivity, Seaquarium flatly refuses to give
Lolita an adequate living space even though it has the budget to do
so.266  Lolita, a highly intelligent, social creature, is nothing more
than a “vehicle by which [Seaquarium] promote[s] their name
[and] their political agenda to obtain money and to gain media
attention.”267
The impact of this case is undoubtedly sad; a majestic, intelli-
gent creature — still capable of recognizing the calls of her family
fifty years later — is forced to continue her life of solitary confine-
ment for profit and human entertainment.268  Beyond the immedi-
ate impact on Lolita, this holding will provide further support for
the defense of exhibitors holding their animals in subpar condi-
tions.269  Animal activists, however, do not plan on abandoning
261. Greg Allen, SeaWorld Agrees to End Captive Breading of Killer Whales, NPR
(Mar. 17, 2016), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/17/
470720804/seaworld-agrees-to-end-captive-breeding-of-killer-whales (stating
SeaWorld’s plan).
262. Jonathan Kendall, PETA Seeks Animal-Cruelty Charges Against Miami Sea-
quarium, MIAMI NEW TIMES (Aug. 3, 2020), https://www.miaminewtimes.com/
news/lolita-2020-peta-seeks-cruelty-charges-against-miami-seaquarium-11645755
(stating PETA seeks criminal charges as Lolita’s abuse continues).
263. Todd Tongen, Miami Seaquarium Unwavering in Stance Regarding Lolita the
Killer Whale, LOC. 10 NEWS (May 24, 2018), https://www.local10.com/news/2018/
05/24/miami-seaquarium-unwavering-in-stance-regarding-lolita-the-killer-whale/
(describing Seaquarium’s renovation).
264. Id. (stating that Lolita’s tank received no renovation).
265. Id. (noting addition of jumbotron was only change to Lolita’s tank, ad-
ded for audience benefit).
266. See id. (inferring Seaquarium has budget to renovate Lolita’s tank but
chose not to).
267. Id. (stating how animal activists view Seaquarium’s treatment of Lolita).
268. Lynda Mapes, Puget Sound Orca Lolita to Remain Captive at Miami Sea-
quarium, Court Rules, SEATTLE TIMES, https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/
environment/orca-lolita-to-remain-captive-at-miami-seaquarium-court-rules/ (last
updated May 13, 2019) (stating outcome of case).
269. See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Miami Sea-
quarium, 879 F.3d 1142, 1150 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding harm must be “serious”
without explaining what “serious” harm entails).
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Lolita like Seaquarium did during Hurricane Irma.270  Activitists
continue to fight for her retirement to a seapen off the Puget
Sound where she could be reunited with her familial pod.271  With
hope — and an equitable ruling from the court — Lolita may one
day be able to return to her home waters to live out the rest of her
life with her family.272
Anne Ringelestein*
270. Kendall, supra note 262 (explaining how PETA is continuing to fight
Seaquarium).
271. Id. (highlighting activists’ requests for Lolita).
272. Mapes, supra note 268 (stating ideal outcome for Lolita).
* J.D. Candidate, May 2022, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; B.A., Philosophy, 2018, The University of Iowa. I would first like to thank my
family — my parents, Lisa and Don, and my brother, Johnny — for wholeheartedly
supporting me through everything and for cultivating a love of the environment
from a very early age. Thank you for always believing in me and encouraging me to
chase my dreams. I would also like to acknowledge my best friend — Cressie
Goode — for her continual support and motivation throughout law school. With-
out each of you, I am certain that I would not be where I am today. Finally, I would
like to dedicate this Note to Lolita; I sincerely hope she may swim freely someday
soon.
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